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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-670359

25 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
37th Signal Battalion (Spt)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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670359

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 37TH SIGNAL BATTALION (SPT)
APO 96337

SCCVNG-DN-OP

13 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April
1967 Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

TO: Commanding Officer
21st Signal Group
APO 96240

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OF UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General:

a. The 37th Signal Battalion's organization or mission definition did not basically change during this period. Two new signal sites were developed in the battalion area of responsibility.

b. Increased numbers of personnel and TO&E equipment arrived which eased shortages in both areas, but an increase in sites manned kept the battalion short in certain MOS's.

c. New communications facilities, and an increase in the number of circuits and systems were engineered to meet the expanding demand in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

2. Activities:

a. In addition to fulfilling normal mission requirements, the battalion was occupied with the movement and allocation of personnel and equipment to fill the TO&E slots of the companies.

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ACSFOR-RO File
670359

ATTN: "FOR-OT-RD"
WASH. DC 20310

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b. Companies directed their efforts towards further organization and development, and toward meeting the requirement of expanded communications facilities.

c. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment and A Company cleaned up and rebuilt portions of the compound after the rocket attack (140 MM Russian made) on 27 February. Nine EM were killed and 15 were wounded, besides damage to billets and communications facilities.

d. The battalion training program was expanded to include increased attention and training on the TAERS program.

e. The Buddy System was initiated to further develop US and ARVN friendship and mutual cooperation and assistance in the communications field.

f. The battalion realigned its resources to support TF Oregon in the Chu Lai area Commencing in April.

3. Personnel and Administration:

a. The battalion is presently operating at 87% of its authorized strength. This has enabled the battalion to properly utilize personnel in their assigned MOS's. The most critical MOS shortages are in the following areas:

- (1) 31M - Radio Relay Attendant
- (2) 31K - Crypto Repairman
- (3) 63C40 - Motor Sergeant
- (4) 94B20 - First Cook

b. Effective the 4th of May the battalion's Finance Section will be transferred to Da Nang Sub-Area Command to become a part of the Modified Military Pay System. Reduction of errors and improvement of service to individuals is supposed to be anticipated, however the loss of my ability to control and therefore rectify pay errors rapidly may be a morale loss.

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c. Awards and Decorations: During the early morning hours on 27 February 1967, the battalion was hit by heavy caliber rocket attack. Eight courageous soldiers and one attached Marine were killed and fifteen wounded. For those nine who sacrificed their lives for their country, a memorial stone with their names carved on a marble plaque has been placed in the Battalion Headquarters area. For their heroic actions during the rocket attack the following individuals received awards:

(1) Bronze Star with V device

Specialist Four Paul Driggers

Specialist Four Michael P. Peaks

Specialist Four Steven L. French

(2) ACM for Valor

Sergeant First Class E-7 Robert Jones

Staff Sergeant E-6 Richard Bernhart

Staff Sergeant E-6 Odis Johnson

Staff Sergeant E-6 Alejandro Gonzales

Specialist Four Donald Mickolajzyk

Specialist Four James Cooley

Specialist Four Larry Padgett

4. Security:

a. The Intelligence Section has taken over complete responsibility for clearance validation during this quarter. Before a clearance can be validated the individual's 201 file and health records are closely checked for derogatory information. A local files check is made to assist in identifying potential trouble makers. All individuals coming into the battalion are briefed by the Intelligence section on SAEDA, security matters and on different aspects peculiar to the intelligence effort in Viet Nam.

b. Security inspections have been conducted at each company to insure that proper procedures are being followed in the handling of classified information. This was the first inspection of this type conducted by the Intelligence Section. Similar inspections will be conducted every 60 days. Increased attention has been directed towards a sound and productive intelligence security program.

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c. Since the last enemy rocket attack at the Da Nang Signal Site bunkers have been strengthened and rebuilt. Additional bunkers and revetments have been constructed. Improved revetments have been constructed around all communication equipment, including vans and buildings that house the equipment. Each company has started a similar program for protection against enemy attack.

d. A new warning siren has been installed on the Da Nang Signal Site, which supplements the Air Force warning system. A night watch is assigned in each billets when intelligence reports indicate a possible enemy attack. This is to implement normal warning methods to reduce the possibility of troops being caught in their billets without any warning of an attack.

5. Safety: None

6. Training:

a. The training program this quarter for the 37th Signal Battalion (SPT) has been oriented to:

- (1) Improve individual proficiency in occupational specialties.
- (2) To cross train individuals in related MOS's.
- (3) To conduct familiarization firing on individual and crew-served weapons.
- (4) To prescribe standards for material readiness and supply records.
- (5) To disseminate required and selected command information subjects.
- (6) To review and rehearse physical security measures.
- (7) To continue the inspection program.
- (8) To revise the athletic program.
- (9) To insure the attendance of qualified personnel at the in-country schools; The Cable Splicer Course, The MSQ-73 Course, and the AN/GRC-50 Operators Course.

b. In addition to the attendance at in-country schools, seventy nine (79) enlisted personnel are being cross-trained in at least one other MOS to provide an indepth capability and flexibility in MOS's essential to the mission.

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c. In order to insure that the maximum number of people receive the required training, evening classes have been instituted. This has a dual effect. People working shifts are able to attend mandatory training classes.

d. The assistance received from higher headquarters in the form of training regulations, other training documents, and training meetings has been of great value in organizing a training program.

e. One of the more successful training programs this quarter was in communications center operations. All newly assigned 72B20's received formal instruction in communication center operations and procedures peculiar to the I Corps Communications Center. Personnel received both class room and practical training. Those failing the practical examination were required to repeat the training in the area they were found to be deficient. Seventeen communication center specialists attended the course this quarter.

f. Training is geared to the units needs. This has resulted in a more effective training program. Even though a Battalion Master Training Schedule is published as a guide, companies are allowed a latitude so they can include subjects needed to improve their efficiency and proficiency in their particular area.

7. Operations:

a. The general mission and area of responsibility of the 37th Signal Battalion did not change this quarter.

b. New VHF, Tropo and Microwave Systems installed this quarter:

(1) One AN/TRC-24 system between Hue and Phu Bai was installed in March. This system supports the 1st Marine Division at Phu Bai.

(2) Two AN/TRC-24 VHF systems were installed between Cu Lao Re Island and the mainland in April. One system terminates at Chu Lai and the other terminates at Duc Pho. These systems are used to support Task Force Oregon.

(3) One AN/TRC-129 and three TRC-66's were installed in Cu Lao Re Island. The AN/TRC-129 and one TRC-66 shoots from Cu Lao Re Island to Vung Chou Mountain located at Qui Nhon. TRC-66 system is terminated to Chu Lai. The other TRC-66 system is terminated in Da Nang.

c. A switchboard, AN/MTC-9 was installed at Chu Lai during this quarter. This replaced an AN/MTC-1 switchboard which was operated by the Marines. The AN/MTC-9 is jointly operated by C Company and the

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7th Communications Battalion. A larger board was needed due to the increased demand for telephone service in the Chu Lai area.

d. There were twelve AN/GRC-50 radios received during this quarter. There were several AN/MRC-102 systems installed in order to release sufficient amount of AN/TAC-24 and AN/TCC-7 equipment to support Task Force Oregon.

(1) One AN/MRC-102 system was installed from Da Nang to Hoi AN.

(2) Two AN/MRC-102 systems were installed from Chu Lai to Chu Lai South.

(3) One AN/MRC-102 system was installed from Hill 204 located in Da Nang to Chu Lai. This system was installed to provide additional voice and TTY channels in support of the III MAF. It also provides the battalion with sole user capability from Company C Headquarters at Chu Lai to the battalion headquarters in Da Nang.

e. Construction of a new DCO building commenced at Phu Bai this quarter. This 600 Dial Central Line Office will provide termination for local or common battery subscriber circuits, and manual or dial trunks. The DCO is being built to provide better telephone service to the ever increasing demand in the Phu Bai area.

f. During the first half of March the 37th Signal Battalion supported the first ARVN Division Advisory Team with radio-teletype support during a major operation. Two radio sets AN/GRC-46 and teams are kept operational and ready to support I Corps Advisory Teams as required.

g. During the month of March, the 37th Signal Battalion installed one five pair and two spiral four cables from Puma to the Da Nang Tape Relay Facilities, the First Logistical Command and the two helicopter Companies located in Da Nang East. The project is an interim measure until the Air Force 600 pair cable is installed. Completion is scheduled for on or about 1 July 1967.

h. Construction of two Communication Centers commenced this quarter. One was installed at Quang Tri and another at Tam Ky. They will provide the advisory teams with secured TTY circuits.

i. Construction of a new I Corps Communications Center commenced this quarter on the ARVN I Corps Compound in Da Nang. This new building will be air conditioned, and have new repair facilities and new equipment which will provide more efficient Com/Center service within the I Corps Area.

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j. There were several new semi-permanent buildings constructed and VHF equipment was removed from vans into these new structures. The buildings were constructed at Quang Tri, Hoi An, Chu Lai and Tam Ky. The relocation of the equipment from vans to the radio buildings with ample room for the equipment increased working space for operators and maintenance personnel, and improved air circulation, has improved the quality and reliability of the systems. The number of operators per shift also reduced.

k. The chart below outlines the communications facilities as of 30 April 1967 operated by the 37th Signal Battalion, the 362nd Signal (Light Tropo) Company, 544th Signal Detachment, and the 5th TCMS Tropo units in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

Long Lines Communications

VHF Systems (12 Channel)	14
Tropo System (60 Channel AF)	3
Tropo Systems (24 Channel)	4
544th S:S Det.	1
16 Channel Tone Packs	5
8 Channel Tone Packs	3
4 Channel Tone Packs	3
Voice Circuits	206
Teletype Circuits	63

Communications Center Operations

Major Relay Station	0
Minor Relay Stations	1
Tributary Stations	3

Telephone Switchboard Operations

900-Line Manual Switchboard	1
600-Line Manual Switchboard	0
300-Line Manual Switchboard	4

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60 - Line Manual Switchboard	5
30 - Line Manual Switchboard	0
12 - Line Manual Switchboard	2
Subscriber Phones	1604

Radio Operations

HF Radio Nets	2
HF Radio Stations	5
AFRS Stations	2

Control Centers

ACCC	4
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8. Logistics:

a. Transportation of equipment to and from support or subordinate units remains a problem area. In-coming equipment and items requested by outlying sites must be stored for lengthy periods of time at the Qui Nhon Depot or at Battalion Headquarters in Da Nang pending available transport.

b. The problem of deadlined power generating equipment is not as critical as it was during the last period. The current percentage of deadlined generators rated between 5 KW and 10 KW is 23%. The percentage of deadlined generators in this category is 63%. Shortages continue to exist particularly 3 KW, 5KW, 15 KW, and 45 KW generators. Maintenance and supply support for power generators continues to be a problem.

c. The battalion has 41% of the total number vehicles authorized. (An additional thirty-seven Trucks, Cargo $\frac{1}{4}$ ton have just arrived from Depot for this unit which will bring the number of vehicles for the battalion to 68% of total authorization strength.) A critical shortage of Truck, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ ton and Truck, Cargo $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton still exists in this unit. Of the fortyseven Truck Cargo $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton authorized, twenty-one are on-hand. Fifteen of these trucks are obsolete M-211 models. Of twenty-seven Truck Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ ton vehicles authorized, fourteen are on hand. Of this number seven are obsolete M-37 models. Parts are difficult to obtain to keep obsolete models operational.

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d. Due to a significant increase in the amount of requisitions of electronic repair parts being processed, the overall percentage of filled requisitions is much lower than that of earlier reports. There are presently about 2200 items on D priorities requisitioned with less than 200 filled. Of approximately 470 Red Ball Express requisitions submitted, about 170 were filled. The majority of the requisitions were submitted within the past 30 days. The fill for "A" priority requests has been excellent. Eighty per cent of "O2" priorities were filled within 3 to 8 days. "D" priorities are in some cases being received from 21 to 27 days.

e. Continued maximum efforts are being exerted by the 37th Signal Battalion, the 21st Signal Group, the 1st Signal Brigade and the Da Nang Sub Area Command (1st Logistical Command) to solve the logistical problems.

9. Aviation: The Battalion has not yet received the personnel or equipment authorized for the Aviation Section. Aviation support is coordinated by the 21st Signal Group and normally is provided by the 4th Signal Battalion. Operations, resupply, and timely movement of critical repair parts to restore troublesome systems is still drastically affected by the lack of an organic aviation system. To move personnel and transportation to move maintenance personnel and spare equipment. This same was cited in the last quarterly report. A partial solution was implemented. One helicopter is staying within the battalion area of responsibility for at least three days each week.

10. Organizational Structure:

a. MTO&E 11-500D is the guidelines on which the battalion is organized.

b. As of 30 April, the 37th Signal Battalion consisted of: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, A Company, B Company, and C Company.

c. There were no attachments or detachments during the quarter.

d. Units under the operational control of the 37th Signal Battalion or over which supervision is exercised under Brigade Regulation 10-10 are:

- (1) 362nd Signal Company (Light Troop) (Northern Area)
- (2) 544th Signal Detachment (Troop Team with/in I Corps)
- (3) 5th TCUMS (Air Force Troop Teams with I Corps)

Section 2

Commander's Observations and Recommendations

PART I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. Personnel

Timely Personnel Actions

Item: Get Pertinent Personnel Information to the Men.

Discussion: Men assigned to isolated signal sites often do not have access to regulations concerning extensions, special leaves, assignment preferences ect. As a result, there is a chance for personnel action errors. Men's career patterns can be adversely affected, or men often do not receive privileges available to them due to an error in personnel actions, whether their fault or not. Good men often terminate their careers early, and leave the Army in disgust as the result of administrative error.

Observation: Administrative personnel actions should be anticipated and submitted on a timely basis. To prevent the loss of good men through late extensions, or through other administrative errors, the personnel situation should be carefully and constantly monitored. Personnel contact teams should be formed and should visit isolated signal sites. These teams can inform the men of the contents of regulations and changes of most interest to them. Questions can be answered. If the formation of these teams is not feasible, men should be brought into the Company or Battalion headquarters on a scheduled basis for counselling on personnel matters.

Item: Tour Length Too Short For Battalion Commanders.

Discussion: It takes six months to know all of the customers a battalion commander serves, and to gain a perspective of relative importance. During this period, a battalion commander strives to develop rapport which causes his customers to regard him as "their personal signal officer". It is at this point that the commander really becomes effective. As soon as the "One hundredth night comes" - one hundred days to rotation it takes an iron will to dismiss the rotation trauma and remain effective.

Morale

Item: Give the Men a Goal

Discussion: Give men something more than encouragement - a goal. Then stand back and watch. Some of the most isolated sites have the highest morale because, one, they can see progress and two, they are doing it with their own hands.

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Observation: The elan this starts is contagious. At Tam Ky, the entire site got together and extended so that they could see their project, new quarters and communications building, through to completion. This also increases mission capability and efficiency.

b. Operations

Item: Benefits of Communications Liaison with Other Services

Discussion: It has been found that other services are not always aware of the communications means available from their neighbors resources. This can often cause confusion, duplication and untimely and costly delays in the provision of communications support.

Observation: By maintaining a close liaison with other services in your area of responsibility, you can keep them informed of the communications available. Their knowledge of communications means available to them makes it possible to furnish service quickly and economically, and is invaluable when support is needed in time of crisis.

Generator Operations

Item: Generator Operator Proficiency

Discussion: During recent inspections, operators were asked to start back up generators. Often, the generators would not start immediately, or trouble developed "all at once". Power considerations are among the most critical in signal operations, and shoddiness will only lead to prolonged system outages.

Observation: Many of the signal sites in Viet Nam are powered by generators, or have generators which serve as back up power. Commanders should not rely on the external appearance of generators or log books. During an inspection back up generators should be started, and emergency power procedures actually tested.

c. Training and Organization

MOS Training

Item: Training of critical MOS personnel at Brigade Schools

Discussion: Certain MOS's remain in critical shortage and are adversely affecting the mission. Units cannot supply input personnel for the Brigade School in these MOS's without reducing their site manning below a level which would make continuous operation impossible.

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Observation: Trainable personnel with MOS's closely associated with a units critical MOS or with related entry MOS's should be trained by the Brigade School. This formal training would allow a unit to send personnel to school without greatly hampering its performance and would allow flexibility in providing a continuous stream of qualified personnel in critical MOS's.

Enemy Attacks

Item: 140 MM Rocket Attack

Discussion: On the morning of 27 February 1967, several rocket rounds landed on the compound causing casualties and facilities damage. Alert procedures, training and sandbagging of equipment precluded a severe loss of life and equipment. The VC normally put one or two rounds in the tube and then wait a few seconds before firing a TOT. We have instructed our people to get under their beds, and pull the mattresses over them immediately when they hear initial incoming rounds or explosions. Running towards a bunker, or curiosity after the first rounds will often produce heavy casualties as the TOT fire will catch them running in the open and in a state of disorganization. The men should go to the bunkers after they are sure the last of the TOT rounds have exploded.

Observation: The men killed or wounded during this attack had not gotten under their beds. The men who reacted quickly and got under their beds with mattresses are alive and whole today. Constant briefings, practice alerts, and the sandbagging and protection of equipment will keep an unit operational even though it is subjected to a mortar or rocket attack.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics

Item: Equipment Rehabilitation on a Scheduled Basis.

Discussion: Equipment on isolated sites is subjected to long and hard usage under unfavorable climatic conditions. Seldom do trained maintenance men have an opportunity to travel to the sites due to transportation difficulties, weather, or shortage of personnel. To insure the most reliable service from the equipment, a program to rotate, check, and rehabilitate equipment is a good insurance policy. All AN/TRC-24, AN/TCC-7, and teletype equipment AN/TT-76's are being rotated and brought into the electronic maintenance shop, completely cleaned and checked. Teletype is exchanged every three months. VHF gear is being T'd in rotation.

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f. Safety: None

g. Aviation

Item: Organic Aviation Section

Discussion: The 37th Signal Battalion operated again this quarter without the benefit of an organic aviation section. Much of the equipment, supplies, and most personnel we still move by air. Arranging air support from other military agencies is still difficult. The 21st Signal Group coordinates helicopter support when available. That support was extended to the 37th on a continuing basis during project Oregon. Without it, coordination, movement of vital equipment and important personnel, would have been seriously hampered. The mission would have been adversely affected.

Observation: Operational capability and the flexibility of a unit that is dispersed over a wide area are immeasurably increased by organic air support. Timely air support is often critical to the mission. Battalions operating in the country or coming into the country with a support mission covering a large area should be insured of having an operational organic air section.

PART II: Recommendations (Lessons Learned)

Appropriate action has been accomplished on the observations contained in Section II, Part I.

Recommendations:

a. Battalion Commanders tours in Viet Nam should be increased to 18 months.


b. Personnel assigned to the 1st Signal Brigade Schools for training should come from non - critical MOS's to be trained in critical MOS's.

c. Increased attention should be given to insuring organic aviation sections of the battalion receive the authorized personnel and equipment.


HERBERT C. HOLLANDER
LTC, SigC
Commanding

5

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE



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SCCVNG-SY

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April
1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST SIGNAL GROUP, APO 96240

28 May 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), APO 96307

TO: Commanding General, USASTRATCOM, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion report, subject as above.

2. Concur with recommendations and observations made by CO, 37th Signal Battalion.

3. The benefits of communication liaison with other services (Sec II Part 1) is a good point, particularly with respect to cable installation. For example, after coordination one service installs a buried cable over the same route another was planning to use for its cable. By using the same trench, duplication of effort will be eliminated. This also precludes the possibilities of damaging the existing cable previously installed.

4. Personnel to be assigned from group units to the 1st Signal Brigade School can be selected from non-critical MOS's, however, those selected should possess a related MOS within the particular field to be studied at the school. In this manner the individual can be formally cross trained to provide the unit with in-depth capabilities.

5. The observation of operator maintenance proficiency on generator equipment is noteworthy (Sec II. Part 1). A recent study conducted by the 1st Signal Brigade ACOC reveals that a large percentage of communication "down time" was due to insufficient operator knowledge within this area. This problem will be the subject of command emphasis throughout the 21st Signal Group next quarter.

6. The commander's comment of insuring that the organic sections of the battalion receive the authorized personnel and equipment under current MTOE authorizations is valid. The unavailability of MTOE aviation equipment and personnel hampers the unit's operations, logistical and immediate response to remote sites in the event of urgent breakdowns to communications equipment. Presently, one helicopter is attached from the 41st Signal Battalion as a stop gap measure to alleviate the requirements imposed by Operation Oregon. Further, the 37th Signal Battalion area of responsibility is of sufficient size to warrant assignment of an aviation section.

SCCVNG-SY

28 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April
1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

7. As a result of the 140mm rocket attack at Da Nang, added command emphasis has been placed at all echelons of command on the hardening of defense and protective status of all signal sites. Plans have been reviewed and updated and additional training has been given to personnel to insure they know what action to take in case of enemy attacks. This will be a continuing project.

Charles H. Burr, Jr.

CHARLES H. BURR, JR.

COL, SigC

Commanding

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SCCVOP (15 May 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

AA, HQ, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM), APO SF 96307

7 JUN 1967

TO: \ Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
AFC 96307
Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications
Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

1. IAW AR 1-19, subject report from the 37th Signal Battalion is forwarded.

2. Concur in the Commander's Observations as modified by 1st Indorsement with the exception and comments below:

a. Reference Item, Timely Personnel Actions, page 10. Keeping your men informed is a basic fundamental of Command. The actions described in the observation is a solution to this problem for units with many isolated detachments.


b. Reference Item, Tour Length too Short for Battalion Commanders, page 10. Do not concur with this observation. The length of tour is established at Joint Chiefs of Staff level. A good officer will be totally effective for his tour. If an officer will slack off for the last 100 days of a 1 year tour, he will slack off for the last 100 days of an 18 month tour. The experience of this command has been that very few officers fail to perform effectively throughout their tour of duty.

c. Reference Item, MOS Training, page 11. Concur with comments CO, 21st Signal Group paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement.

d. Reference Item, Organic Aviation Section, page 13. This Battalion should be furnished aviation section personnel and equipment as soon as possible. Aviation assets are controlled by Headquarters USAF and the aircraft requirements for the 37th Signal Battalion are recognized by that headquarters.

3. Concur in the Commander's Recommendations letters b and c. Do not concur in recommendation a reference discussion paragraph 2b above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


THOMAS D. DREDSON Jr.
Colonel, GS,
Chief of Staff

AVHCC-DST (15 May 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (MOS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-GT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning critical MOS shortages, paragraph 3a, page 2: The 1st Signal Brigade receives replacements from USASTRATCOM. Both headquarters are cognizant of the situation. The 1st Signal Brigade operates MOS courses which provide some relief from shortages. The class 31 MOS is short DA wide.

b. Reference item concerning transportation of equipment to and from support or subordinate units, paragraph 8a, page 8: Concur. The transportation problem referred to by unit is obviously connected to the shortage of TOE trucks referred to in paragraph 8c, page 8. Movements between parent and subordinate elements and support elements are a unit responsibility. Although the routine sea and airlift capability from Qui Nhon to I CTZ was temporarily disrupted by the "Oregon" operation, it is now considered adequate to meet requirements. The issue of the TOE equipment when it becomes available should eliminate transportation problems discussed by unit.

c. Reference item concerning the problem of deadlined power generating equipment, paragraph 8b, page 8: Non-Concur. The deadline rate indicated is well above the USARV average which indicates that the problem is exclusive to this particular unit. Liaison between unit commanders and direct support units should be initiated without delay to ascertain the cause. There are 3KW and 5KW 60 Cycle generators available to fill unit authorizations. There is a command shortage of 15 KW, 30 KW and 45KW, 60 Cycle generators.

d. Reference item concerning a critical shortage of trucks, paragraph 8c, page 8: Trucks are arriving from CONUS and 2d Logistical Command in fairly large quantities. These assets are being used to fill TOE shortages prior to exchanging the M211 models for the M35A2. With the introduction of the M715 1 1/4 ton truck in the 1st Qtr FY 68 to replace the M37 3/4 ton truck in combat units, sufficient assets should become available to fill all TOE shortages during that same time frame.

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJ CT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Referenced item concerning organic aviation section, page 13, and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: Until DA policy is changed aircraft assets will not be available for CS and CSS units. Aviation support must be provided from current assets on a priority basis. Although aircraft requirements for many CS and CSS units are recognized, assets are not available to fill these requirements.

f. Reference item concerning MOS training, paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement, and paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement: 1st Signal Brigade will continue to stress cross training at their school for those students attending from within the brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. J. KENNEDY
CPL AGC
Asst. Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(15 May 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 37th Sig Bn (Spt) (RCS CSFOR-65)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

13 SEP 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the
report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



H. SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG